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THE JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO TREATMENT:
PANACEA OR PANDORA'S BOX?
Jill K. McNulty* and Hon. William S. White**
I.

EARLY HISTORY

Since its inception in the mid-19th century, the so-called
juvenile justice system has avowed concern about the treatment of children. Although we are now entering the last quarter
of the 20th century, the nature and objects of this concern still
reflect, to some extent, the social attitudes characteristic of the
earlier era.
The opening of the New York House of Refuge in 1825 is
considered by many as the beginning of the separate system for
dealing with juvenile deviants.' The House was established for
all such children as shall be taken up or committed as
vagrants, or convicted of criminal offenses ...

as may in

the judgment of the Court of General Sessions of the
Peace, or of the Court of Oyer and Terminer, . .. or of the
jury before whom any such offender shall be tried, or of the
Police Magistrates, or of the Commissioners of the AlmsHouse and Bridewell . . . be proper objects ....

The House was not for all juvenile offenders, but only for "proper objects," those who could be rescued from a life of crime.'
Responsibility for identifying such children was vested in per4
sons both in the poor relief and the justice systems.
Whether a child's deviant behavior was viewed as a product of his own perversity or of his poverty and resulting dependence on public charity made little difference to the mid-19th
century reformers. Poverty was considered a catalyst to future
* A.B., 1957, J.D., 1960, Northwestern University; Associate Professor of Law,
I.T.T.-Chicago-Kent College of Law. Professor McNulty served as legal consultant
to the Juvenile Court of Cook County, Illinois, until March, 1976.
** A.B., 1935, J.D., 1937, University of Chicago; Presiding Judge, Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois, Juvenile Division.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Richard Louderman, thirdyear student, Chicago-Kent College of Law, in the preparation of the footnotes and text
contained therein for this article.
1. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970) Ihereinafter cited as Fox].
2. Id. at 1190, citing Act of March 29, 1824, ch. 126, § 4, [1824] N.Y. Laws III.
3. See Fox, supra note 1, at 1190.
4. Id. at 1190-91.
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criminality such as vagrancy, begging and theft.' As Professor
Sanford Fox concluded: "Protection of society against crime
and vicious pauperism by means of a more severe and more
efficient institutionalization, provided the rationale for the
county poorhouse system and for the House of Refuge."'
In 1838 the Refuge system was challenged in Ex parte
Crouse.' Mary Ann Crouse had been committed to the Philadelphia House of Refuge by a justice of the peace on her
mother's allegation that her vicious conduct had rendered her
beyond the mother's control. Her father brought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that her confinement had been obtained
without due process because she had been denied the right to
jury trial guaranteed to criminal defendants by the state constitution. The court in Crouse rejected that argument, and
adopted a "hands off" attitude towards internal administration of the institution. As long as the declared purpose of the
Philadelphia House was socially and morally proper, its legal
validity was thereby established, and the court would make no
further effort to inquire into the actual treatment of Mary Ann
or to determine whether the administration of the House was
punitive or oppressive."
The Crouse case was the leading authority for the right of
the state as parens patriae to apply coercive sanctions to children it predicted might go astray in the future.' Implicit in the
theory was the assumption that with proper treatment for such
children-that is, stern discipline-a life of crime could be
averted. House rules were rigidly enforced, infractions punished severely."' It was the nature of this coercion that led
reformers in the middle and latter part of the 19th century to
bewail the fate of the children caught up in the criminal system." The focus of concern was not the lack of fairness in the
commitment process, but rather the nature of the confinement
to which children were subjected. Emphasis on institutional
reform characterized the child welfare movement of this era.2
The 19th century reform movement culminated in the en5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1201.
Id.
4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838).
Fox, supra note 1, at 1206.
4 Whart. at 11.
See Fox, supra note 1, at 1195 n.43.
Id. at 1222-29.
Id.
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actment in 1899 of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, the first in
the nation. " The Illinois Act provided that
the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by
its parents, and in all cases where it can properly be done
the child [shall be] placed in an improved family home
and become a member of the family by legal adoption or
otherwise. 4
This was a new standard for the treatment of juveniles. The
Act also reflected much of the old approach, however, restating
the belief prevalent at the time (and still enjoying much vitality today) that future criminality is predictable by present deviant behavior. Further, there were few provisions imposing
procedural formality in hearings for children subject to the
court's jurisdiction. Institutional care facilities available to
children did not improve. A provision of the Act prohibited
placing children under 12 in jails but, ironically, appropriations necessary to finance special detention care were deleted
from the final bill.' The legislature offered no financial aid to
provide the promised improved care and custody for children.
There was one advance: the Act provided for probation
officers to assist the court. They were, however, to serve without remuneration." The first annual report of the Juvenile
Court of Cook County showed that the court borrowed personnel from other agencies and commissioned them as probation
officers-21 truant officers from the Board of Education, 16
police officers, 11 agents from associations handling cases of
dependent children, and 36 other persons engaged in child welfare work, a total of 94.11
Four days after the Act became law, the first case was filed
and set for hearing. The petitioner, the child's own father, alleged simply, "I am unable to keep at home, associates with
bad boys, steals newspapers, etc."'" A jury of six impaneled to
hear the case found the boy to be dependent and he was com13. Id.
14. Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 21, [18991 Ill. Laws 130.
15. COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE COURTS, REPORT TO THE CHICAGO BAR AssocIATION 4
(1899).
16. JUVENILE COURT OF COOK COUNTY, FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 19 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as COOK COUNTY REPORT].
17. !d. at 20.
18. Id.
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mitted to the Illinois Manual Training School. He was 11 years
old. H
During the first year of the court's existence, delinquents
were detained in a remodeled cottage.2"' The following year the
detention home was moved to a three-story building which was
referred to by the people who worked there as "the barn" because a barn at the rear of the premises formed an important
part of the home."' Dependent children were kept at the detention hospital, where, in the words of the report, "the unfortunate insane are awaiting trial." 2
Thus America's first juvenile court, an institution soon to
be established in every state, " coupled nobility of purpose with
very modest beginnings indeed.
There were periodic cries for reform. In 1911 a Chicago
newspaper began a campaign with stories of cases allegedly
mishandled; probation officers were pictured as "child snatchers" rather than "child savers."" The Cook County Board responded by dismissing the chief probation officer." He was
later restored to his position by the Illinois Supreme Court on
the ground that the County Board, as a part of the legislative
branch of government, could not dismiss an assistant of the
judicial branch." Except for a few such skirmishes, the practices and procedures of the juvenile justice system remained for
the most part unscrutinized by the judiciary for over 60 years
after its inception.
Although juvenile court statutes throughout the country
contain much social welfare rhetoric about treatment and rehabilitation, the jurisdictional emphasis of such statutes relating
to delinquent minors is largely based upon penal law. Problems
of applying in the juvenile court a social welfare philosophy,
with its deterministic underpinnings, come sharply into focus
when one recognizes that the primary law for juvenile courts in
delinquency matters is the criminal law, replete as it is with
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id.
22. Id.at 20.
23. In California the Juvenile Court was established in 1904. Cal. Stats. (1903),
ch. 43, at 44-48. Note, A Look at the California Juvenile Court Past, Present and
Future, 1 LINCOLN L. REV. 166 (1966).
24. COOK COUNTY REPORT, supra note 16, at 21-22.
25. Id.at 21.
26. Witter v. County Comm'rs, 256 Ill.
616, 100 N.E. 148 (1912).
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27
notions of moral blameworthiness and condemnation. While
it is true that juvenile-offender legislation has traditionally
provided that a juvenile delinquency adjudication shall not
constitute a conviction of crime nor result in loss of certain civil
rights,2" these official policy pronouncements have had little
influence upon basic social attitudes.

II.

PROCEDURAL REFORM

The disparity between the benevolent rhetoric and the
reality of the juvenile justice system began to attract national
attention in the mid-1960's. The report issued in 1967 by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was sharply critical of the system and recommended a number of changes.29 In addition, the United States
Supreme Court in a series of decisions beginning at this time
expressed grave doubt that the juvenile justice system ever
had, or indeed, ever could operate in the benevolent manner
postulated by its founders. The Court found in these cases that
since the consequences of a juvenile court adjudication of delinquency resembled closely the consequences of a finding of guilt
in a criminal trial, some of the same procedural protections
mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend30
ment for the latter are also applicable to the former. Expansion of the application of the procedural rights in criminal trials
to delinquency proceedings, however, came to a temporary halt
with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, which held that fundamental
fairness, the basic due process imperative, does not require
states to afford jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings
even though they3 are required in criminal proceedings of a
"serious" nature. '
One of the results of imposing some of the procedural safe27.

F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 49-60 (1964) [hereinafter

cited as F. ALLENi. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-2 (Supp. 1976).
28. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-9 (Supp. 1976); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 503 (West 1972).

29.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE, REPORT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 78-89 (1967).

30. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See also, In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) ("beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof applicable to criminal proceedings is also applicable to a juvenile court adjudication of a minor for delinquency);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (notice, hearing, right to counsel, and privilege against
self-incrimination must be afforded a minor in a juvenile court adjudication for delinquency).
31. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
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guards of the criminal trial process was to make the juvenile
delinquency adjudication hearing more adversary in nature. In
juvenile courtrooms of large metropolitan areas today, one sees
the full panoply of trial personnel-judge, court reporter, clerk,
bailiffs and, of course, prosecutor and defense counsel. :" Although the Supreme Court deplored the lack of rehabilitative
resources available to juvenile courts, its decisions brought
only more procedural formality to the court, in no way alleviating the paucity of resources.
This alteration of the juvenile delinquency adjudication
process was not welcomed by many social workers, who had
been and still are the principal treatment agents of the juvenile
court. Their role in the process was attenuated and that of the
lawyer enhanced.:' Prior to the Supreme Court decision in In
re Gault, it was not uncommon for the juvenile court probation
officer (ordinarily a social worker) to be the pre-trial investigator, the prosecutor, counsel for the child and court supervisor
of the child after adjudication. 3 The role conflicts are obvious,
and after Gault, attorneys represented the state and the child
before the court.
It is important to note, however, that the focus of the
Supreme Court's attention on the juvenile court process has
been the adjudication or trial phase. The dispositional phase,
at which the judicial decision of what to do to or for the child
is made, has to date been left unexamined. In addition, the
Supreme Court has declined to address the constitutional questions posed by the dearth of dispositional resources available
to the juvenile court, a problem which in part prevents the
system from working in the manner intended by its originators.
If it is fair to say that McKeiver represents a reflective
pause by the Supreme Court to consider the wisdom of further
imposing procedural protections of the criminal judicial process upon the juvenile justice system, 5 then perhaps it is time
32. For a general discussion of the juvenile court process see Piersma, Ganousis
& Kramer, The Juvenile Court: Current Problems, Legislative Proposals,and a Model
Act, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1975).
33. For a discussion of the role of the attorney in juvenile court proceedings see
Symposium, Some Theoretical and PracticalProblems in Formalizing the Juvenile
Court Procedure, 47 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 287 (1971).
34. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. But see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), wherein the Court held that the
constitutional right of a person not to be placed twice in jeopardy was violated when
the state subjected a minor to a juvenile delinquency adjudication hearing and then
subsequently subjected him to a criminal trial as an adult for the same conduct.
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to re-examine the role of the juvenile court in delinquency prevention and in the rehabilitation and reformation of deviant
youth.
III.

THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

A. The State's Right to Subject a Minor to Compulsory
Treatment
Juvenile court statutes reveal that one meaning of the
term "treatment" is the judicial process itself, whereby the
state in its role as parenspatriaeapplies coercive power against
the minor primarily, and his parents secondarily, to alter behavior that is deemed deviant."6 Once a minor is found a fit
subject for juvenile court intervention, the severity of the coercion can range from supervision of the minor in his home,37 to
removal from the home 6 and, in delinquency cases, to incarceration.:" What is the extent of the state's right to compel a child,
in the name of "treatment," to accept intervention designed to
correct behavior that does not conform to societal norms? From
this perspective, there are essentially two questions to be examined. First, what kind of behavior ought to subject a minor
to compulsory treatment by the state? Second, if there are
children whose behavior warrants the application of coercion
by the state, either for the purpose of treating the child or of
protecting society, what treatment must be provided under
such circumstances and what are the limitations, if any, upon
the state's right to subject the minor to treatment against his
or her will?
1. Who should be subject to compulsory treatment?
Many think that one of the unfortunate side effects of the
parens patriae or treatment philosophy has been the jurisdictional overreach of juvenile courts.4" Court-ordered treatment
36. See, e.g., C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY
367 (1966); Note, Parens Patriaeand Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court,
82 YALE L.J. 745, 748 (1973).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 704-7, 705-2 (1)(b)(2) (1972); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 727 (West Supp. 1976).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2(1)(b)(1) (1972); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §
727(b)(West Supp. 1976).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2(I)(a)(5) (1972); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§§ 730-37 (West 1972).
40. See A. GOUGH, COMMENTARY, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, REVISED FINAL DRAF-r (November, 1975), to be published as JOINT
IJA/ABA COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONLAW

CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

(1976) [hereinafter

cited as GOUGH, COMMENTARY];

Gough, The
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is compulsory from the child's standpoint. Refusal to cooperate
in a program of treatment usually leads to further intervention
in the minor's life, so the child may view such offers of "treatment" as punishment rather than therapy no matter how others may perceive it. As one commentator has acknowledged,
"When in an authoritative setting we attempt to do something
for a child because of what he is and needs, we are also doing
something to him.""
This fact necessarily raises the question of the kind of
deviant behavior that justifies juvenile court intervention for
the purpose of "treatment." The "status offender" jurisdiction
of the juvenile court is an excellent example of the problem of
determining who merits compulsory treatment. Certain kinds
of non-criminal conduct such as truancy, ungovernability, and
endangering one's morals-the so-called status offensessubject a minor in almost every state to juvenile court intervention." This reflects the juvenile court movement's original
focus on the child who engaged in minor misconduct.4 3 A traditional reason advanced in support of intervention by the
juvenile court in non-criminal misconduct is that minors who
behave in this way are incipient serious offenders and the
court, in exercise of its delinquency prevention function, has
the right to intervene in the lives of such minors to save them
from a further downward course." Thus, from its very beginning the juvenile court has been involved in predictive guesswork about the potential danger to society of a minor who
commits non-criminal but irritating acts offensive to the community or the family.
A recent series of studies clearly indicate that behavioral
science is extremely poor at predicting which persons, including those with past histories of violent acts, will commit future
Beyond Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of
Paradox, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 182 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Goughi; Note,
Lingovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1387-88, 1408
(1974) Ihereinafter cited as Note, Ungovernabilityl.
41. Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice, 32 Soc. SERV. REV. 116 (1958) (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1976) (beyond
parental control); MICH. COMp. LAW ANN. § 712 A.2 (Supp. 1976)(habitual idleness);
see also GOUGH, COMMENTARY, supra note 40.
43. See, e.g., Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. JUDGES'
J. 42 (1970); Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive Stasis,
1970 Wis. L. REV. 431.
44. See authorities cited in note 43 supra.
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acts of violence.4 5 The temptation to overpredict a tendency to
violence is great. It is the "safe" decision. Cases of underprediction are apt to generate publicity. But the resultof overpredicition is to confine involuntarily for "treatment" many persons
who present little potential danger to the community. It is
highly unlikely that a juvenile court can either predict with any
accuracy which "status offenders" are apt to become serious
offenders or demonstrate that court intervention was a significant factor in restraining such minors from committing criminal acts."
Despite the weakness of the rationale, status offenses
exist, and they give the juvenile court an extraordinarily broad
jurisdictional sweep. In some states status offenses are in7
cluded in the statutory definition of delinquency. In others,
they are a separate category of juvenile court jurisdiction, and
statutes designate such minors as "persons in need of supervision," or the like." ' Often procedural protections afforded a
child accused of a status offense are less than those afforded
to a child charged with delinquency. In Illinois, for example,
the state need prove a status charge only by a preponderance
4
of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
the opportunity exists for subjecting a child to compulsory
treatment through exercise of the juvenile court's statusoffender jurisdiction in cases in which delinquent conduct is
suspected, but the state is unable to meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof required to obtain a delinquency adjudication.
In the Juvenile Court of Cook County all petitions charg45. See, e.g., E. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION 46-51 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as E. SCHURI; Kozol, Boucher & Garafalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of
Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1972); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence
Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 393 (1972); see also the comments of Dr. Alan A.
Stone, Professor of Law and Psychiatry, Harvard University, and Dr. John Speigel of
Brandeis University reported in the Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 28, 1975, at 80.
46. INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE RESEARCH, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH,
YOUTH AND SOCIETY IN ILLINOIS, SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1975).
47. Sixteen states include status offenses in the statutory definition of delinquency: Ala., Ariz., Ark., Conn., Del., Ind., Iowa, Minn., Miss., Mont., Nev., N.H.,
N.J., Pa., W. Va., and Wyo. GOUGH, COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 106 et seq.
48. Thirty-four states define status offenses in a jurisdictional category separate
from that of delinquency: Alas., Colo., D.C., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Kan., Ky.,
La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Mo., Neb., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore.,
R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., and Wis. GOUGH, COMMENTARY,
supra note 40, at 106 et seq.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6 (1972). Cf., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 701
(West Supp. 1976).
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ing status offenses and alleging that a child is a "minor otherwise in need of supervision" (MINS) are heard by one judge
who specializes in dealing with the problems such cases present. Often a MINS petition is filed at the request of a parent
whose motive, revealed at the court hearing, is the apparent
desire to be rid of responsibility for a child whose adolescent
problems have become a source of aggravation' 5 The court is
often viewed by the parent as the vehicle to accomplish this
purpose. The court has little in the way of local placement
resources for such children and no state child welfare agency
has a statutory duty to accept such a child for placement or
treatment unless a court order has been violated." Therefore,
a great deal of judicial energy is spent in attempting to persuade the parent to forgive the child's "transgressions" and to
take him or her home; or alternatively, to persuade the reluctant state child welfare agency to provide suitable placement
for the child outside the home. The child derives little if any
benefit from contact with the court and it is painfully obvious
that the court is ill-equipped to deal effectively with what is
essentially a family squabble."
In many jurisdictions, status offenders eventually are sent
by juvenile courts to the same institutions as delinquent offenders who have committed serious criminal acts. Indeed, in
the case of Nelson v. Heyney discussed in greater detail later,
it was noted that one third of the population of the Indiana
Boys School were non-criminal offenders. Consequently, the
"treatment" many status offenders receive is incarceration
with serious offenders in a juvenile prison.
There is a considerable body of opinion that the status
offense jurisdiction of the juvenile court is the product of statutes that are overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. 4 Al50. It is interesting to note that in the Juvenile Court of Cook County, the "minor
in need of supervision" (MINS) calendar, as compared to the delinquency calendar,
is disproportionately female. Statistics indicate that for the period of January 1,
1975,-December 31, 1975, 14,594 delinquency charges were filed against males as
compared to 1223 against females. During that same period, 1579 MINS petitions were
filed against males as compared to 1928 against females.
51. l.. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2(b)(Supp. 1976).
52. In New York, a large portion of the "persons in need of supervision" (PINS)
caseload of the New York Family Court involved family malfunctioning. Note,
Ungovernability, supra note 40.
53. 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), afJ'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974).
54. In recent years there have been increasing attacks on the status offense
jurisdiction with respect to its vagueness and overbreadth. See, e.g., Wald, Making
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though constitutional attack on MINS statutes has met with
little success, 5 some changes are occurring. New York permits
status offenders to be confined in state training schools,"6 but
prohibits mingling them with delinquents incarcerated in the
same institution. 7 In Illinois the juvenile court may commit to
the state correctional authority only minors aged 13 or older
who have committed an act which, if committed by an adult,
would be punishable by a term of incarceration or imprisonment. This disposition, therefore, is not available to the court
s
for the status offender.
In addition, it may be contended that the recent Supreme
Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUM. RTs. L. REV. 13, 21 (1974); Comment,
"Delinquent Child": A Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 352 (1969). See also
articles listed in GouG.H, COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 14.
55. The higher courts have, in general, rejected the "void for vagueness" attacks
on these statutes. See, e.g., Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1974) (no substantial federal question in a "void for vagueness" challenge
to New York PINS statute); Gonzalez v. Maillard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated
and remanded, 416 U.S. 918 (1974) (vacated and remanded a decision by a three judge
court striking down a portion of the California "beyond-control" statute that extended
jurisdiction of the juvenile court to minors leading or in danger of leading an "idle,
lewd, or immoral life." The California legislature has since deleted this language from
the statute. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1976)); District of Columbia
v. B.J.R., (D.C. Ct. App.), reported in I FAM. L. RPTR. 2235 (1975); E.S.G. v. State,
447 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
56. In re Layette M., 35 N.Y.2d 136, 141, 316 N.E.2d 314, 317, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20,
23 (1974). In this case the court held that it was lawful to place PINS in a training
school for PINS only, regardless of the state trial court's earlier decision in In re Ellery
C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973). The court's essential point
was that PINS could not be mixed with delinquents. The court stated inter alia:
absent a clear showing that the treatment provided at a training school
is significantly inadequate for the task, the current experiment with
training school placement . . . , as authorized by statute (FAMILY COURT
ACT, § 756), should be permitted ...
We are frank to acknowledge the practical limitations upon the
power of the courts to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of treatment afforded PINS children. . . . Surely the role of formulating criteria
to measure the effectiveness of treatment facilities is not and should not
be an exclusively judicial function. It should not be our province to determine what is the best possible treatment or to espouse an ideal but
perhaps unattainable standard. Rather, our role should be to assure the
presence of a bona fide treatment program.
In re Lavette M., 35 N.Y.2d 136, 141, 316 N.E.2d 314, 317, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23-24
(1974).
In effect, the court stated that the parameters of the "right to treatment" consist
in t here being bona fide efforts to treat the child adequately within the scope of present
knowledge.
57. In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973).
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2 (1972). See also, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§§ 508. 510 (West Supp. 1976).
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Court decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson" casts further doubt
upon the constitutionality of the practice in many states of
incarcerating the "status offender." The O'Connor case involved a civil rights action in which the plaintiff alleged that
he had been incarcerated for more than 15 years in a state
institution in violation of his constitutional rights. The jury
found that Mr. Donaldson was dangerous neither to himself
nor to others, that he was capable of self sufficiency, and that,
if mentally ill, he had received no treatment.'" However, the
Supreme Court viewed O'Connor as a "right to release" and
not a "right to treatment" case. The Court thus avoided deciding the questions of whether a dangerous mentally ill person
has a constitutional right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the state, or whether the state may compulsorily
confine a nondangerous mentally ill individual for the purpose
of treatment. On the confinement issue alone, however, there
may be a significant parallel between the holding in O'Connor
and juvenile court status offender jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that compulsory confinement of
a nondangerous mentally ill person capable of self sufficiency
under circumstances where no treatment was provided constituted a violation of the individual's constitutional right to liberty. " It is certainly arguable that truancy, running away from
home, and disobedience to parents are not acts which, standing
alone, indicate that an adolescent minor is dangerous to himself or to others. When such acts lead to incarceration in a
juvenile correctional institution, with the minor merely locked
up and no effort made to address and alleviate the underlying
causes of such behavior, it may be contended that this, too, is
a violation of the child's constitutional right to liberty. In the
words of Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in
O 'Connor:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely
to save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are
different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid
public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance
or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty."2
59.
60.
61.
62.

422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Id. at 573.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 575.
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In addition, Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion
expressed grave reservation about compulsory confinement for
"treatment."
To the extent that this theory may be read to permit a

State to confine an individual simply because it is willing
to provide treatment, regardless of the subject's ability to
function in society, it raises the gravest of constitutional
problems. ....
.
:1
If one takes the position that minority alone renders a person
incapable of self sufficiency, then the Supreme Court's decision
offers little encouragement for the argument that the state has
no right to involuntarily confine a misbehaving minor when it
has no treatment to offer.
In O'Connor the Supreme Court specifically eschewed
endorsement of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding that
a person involuntarily committed for mental illness has a constitutional right to treatment. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion underscores his reservations about such a right.
He rejected the Fifth Circuit's premise that "at least with respect to persons who are not physically dangerous, a State has
no power to confine the mentally ill except for the purpose of
providing them with treatment." 4
That proposition is surely not descriptive of the power
traditionally exercised by the States in this area. Historically, and for a considerable period of time, subsidized
custodial care in private foster homes or boarding houses
was the most benign form of care provided incompetent or
mentally ill persons for whom the States assumed responsibility. Until well into the 19th century the vast majority
of such persons were simply restrained in poorhouses,
almshouses, or jails."
One of the goals of the reform movement of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, Justice Burger noted, was to provide appropriate medical care for the mentally ill; but since many
could not be cured by any known treatment, providing custodial care for the "dependent insane" remained a major concern of the state.
In short, the idea that States may not confine the mentally
ill except for the purpose of providing them with treatment
63. Id.at 585.
64. Id.at 581.
65. Id.at 581-82.
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is of very recent origin, and there is no historical basis for
imposing such a limitation on state power. . . .There can
be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a
State may confine individuals solely to protect society
from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicable disease. . . Additionally, the States are vested
with the historic parens patriaepower, including the duty
to protect "persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves." . . . The classic example of this role is when a
state undertakes to act as "the general guardian of all
infants, idiots, and lunatics.""
Consider the foregoing with respect to a similarly situated
person whose disability is his youth rather than his mental
state. Even if one supports the argument that the state may
exert some measure of control over the status offender and the
non-dangerous delinquent, is there not a duty to protect such
persons from harm that would preclude confinement in institutions with dangerous delinquents? Might not such confinement
violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment?
Perhaps truancy is a matter for schools to deal with. 7
Maybe intra-family disputes should be addressed by community social agencies if the families experiencing such difficulties are willing to accept help. If families are unwilling,
should not the community develop a higher tolerance level for
such problems rather than expect the juvenile court to remove
a child involuntarily from the community for annoying but
minor misconduct?" Assuming even that juvenile court intervention may be appropriate in some "status offender" cases,
few would dispute that incarceration of the minor is a totally
inappropriate response to such behavior.
2. Parameters of the state's right to apply compulsory
sanctions to alter a minor's deviant behavior. Children who
commit criminal acts should be the primary target group for
compulsory "treatment" by juvenile courts. State intervention
can and should include incarceration in appropriate cases. Involuntary confinement, however, may raise constitutional is66. Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601.1 (West Supp. 1976), which
requires that habitual truants be referred to a school attendance review board referral
to the juvenile court.
68. See E.SCHUR, .upra note 45, at 59-63, 81-111; Note, California Runaways,
26 HAS'rIN(;S L.J. 1013 (1975).
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sues. Although the United States Supreme Court has not reviewed the dispositional phase of juvenile court proceedings, a
growing number of lower federal courts are examining the dispositional process and concluding that a minor subjected to
incarceration has a right to treatment that is both fundamental
and of constitutional dimension.
The state's right to punish. Two cases, Nelson v. Heyne"
and Morales v. Turman,7' illustrate a current trend in some
federal courts concerning punishment of incarcerated minors.
Nelson v. Heyne involved a class action brought in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana for
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the operation
of the Indiana Boys School, a medium security correctional
institution for boys 12 to 18 years of age. The court subjected
to constitutional scrutiny several disciplinary practices employed at the school, and its treatment program. The court
found that infliction of corporal punishment severe enough to
cause serious injury and indiscriminate use of protracted periods of solitary confinement were excessive measures, unnecessary to attain the correctional goal, and thus violative of the
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.7 The court's ruling, however, was not limited to prohibiting abusive disciplinary practices. The court found that
minors in custody have a constitutional right to treatment, and
consequently a correctional institution must have affirmative
programs of rehabilitation which meet minimal constitutional
standards of acceptability. In requesting the parties to submit
proposals on programs which would meet such standards, the
district court recognized the difficulties inherent in judicial
intrusion into the treatment process:
The Court is not unmindful of the very great burden it
confronts in fashioning a specific remedy pursuant to these
general findings . . . . The Court sees its present function
as steering a middle course between the indefensible extreme of abstinence and the impossible extreme of superintending the system.7"
69. 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), afJ'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974).
70. 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
71. 355 F. Supp. at 461.
72. Id. For an extensive discussion of the implications of the court's holding on
this aspect of the right to treatment, see text accompanying notes 99-107 infra.
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In contrast, a federal district court in Texas faced with a
similar class action suit, Morales v. Turman," was not at all
hesitant to "superintend the system." Plaintiffs sought relief
from conditions existing at Mountain View State School for
Boys, the maximum security correctional facility then operated
by the Texas Youth Council. The court ordered that any inmate in solitary confinement be visited by his caseworker for a
period of 10 minutes each hour until his release from solitary
confinement, except for the hours between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00
a.m.74 If an inmate was so confined for longer than three consecutive days, a written report prepared by his caseworker justifying the continued confinement was required to be forwarded to
the Executive Director of the Texas Youth Council, to all counsel in the civil action, and to the court.7" Further, if the confinement exceeded 10 consecutive days, the burden of preparing
and filing the reports was shifted to the Executive Director of
the Texas Youth Council.7"
In addition, the court limited commitment or transfer to
the school to those youths who had committed acts which
would be serious felonies of violence if committed by adults."
It also appointed an ombudsman to hear grievances from inmates and staff. The ombudsman was to have access to all
school records, attend all staff meetings, and make recommendations concerning the operation of the school and its compliance with the court's order.7" Finally, the court ordered that all
persons subsequently applying for a position at the school be
required to submit to psychological testing and psychiatric interviews; persons whose test results cast doubt upon their fitness to work with children were not to be employed.79
The state's right to use drugs for institutional control.
Treatment in correctional institutions increasingly involves use
of tranquilizing drugs and aversion therapy for the purpose of
behavior control. The federal appellate court in Nelson v.
Heyne" suggested that there are constitutional limitations as
to their use on minors who are involuntarily incarcerated. The
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
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Nelson court stated that forcible injection of tranquilizing
drugs is violative of the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment if such medication is used for
behavior control rather than as part of a program of individualized therapy, and if it is introduced into the body in an unnecessarily intrusive way: for example, by injection rather than
orally.
Federal courts with increasing frequency are declaring that
fundamental rights such as personal privacy and freedom to
communicate, although necessarily attenuated by institutionalization, are not extinguished by it.s Treatment measures
such as forced drug injection may, in addition, raise first and
fourth amendment problems. If the first amendment guarantee
of free expression prohibits systematic manipulation of one's
very capacity to think and respond, then behavior modification
devices which dull the senses may be violative of this guarantee. Also, if the right to privacy protected under the fourth
amendment encompasses not only security of the person, but
sanctity of the body as well, it may proscribe use of behavioral
control therapy which results in significant physical intrusion
of the body to accomplish the desired therapeutic goal.
The legal theories upon which both the Nelson and
Morales decisions are based have analytical weaknesses. 2 The
decisions rely upon three premises; first, the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; second, the right to communicate protected by the first amendment; and third, the fourteenth amendment due process argument that treatment is the quid pro quo that an incarcerated
minor must receive in exchange for denial, at the trial stage of
juvenile delinquency proceedings, of all the procedural rights
afforded adults accused of crime. 3 The Nelson and Morales
courts broke new ground when they intervened in the correctional process to force development of affirmative treatment
programs; intervention to prevent use of certain punitive sanc81. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
82. For a critique of the various theories advanced to support a constitutional
right to treatment see Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.
157.
83. See also, Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates
of Boy's Training School v. Aifleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alsbrook, 366 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971); Lollis
v. Department of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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tions in the name of treatment, however, rests on much firmer
foundation.
Duration of compulsory treatment. As the many prisoner
mistreatment cases demonstrate, the fourteenth amendment
requires that some procedural safeguards be afforded before
punishment may be imposed, and limits the severity and duration of punishment only to that necessary to attain the correctional goal." That these constitutional limitations are equally
applicable to protect the incarcerated minor when the "treatment" he receives is, in reality, punishment cannot seriously
be doubted.
At this point the question must be asked whether the constitutional theories outlined above are helpful in determining
to what extent, if any, the state may require an incarcerated
minor to participate in rehabilitation programs, and apply
coercion for refusal to cooperate. To what extent may the minor
refuse treatment? Cases involving the right to refuse treatment
are sparse indeed." No case has been found which prohibits a
state from compelling an incarcerated minor to participate in
educational, vocational or recreational programs designed to
assist his eventual reintegration into the community, although
some experts believe that such programs must be voluntary to
have rehabilitative value."
In most jurisdictions a delinquent minor is subject to institutional commitment or supervision during his entire minority,
84. See cases cited in note 81 supra.
85. See, e.g., Melville v. Sabbatino, 30 Conn. Sup. 320, 313 A.2d 886 (1973)
(seventeen-year old, voluntarily admitted to private mental health hospital by his
parents, has the right to sign himself out, despite parental opposition); In re Lee, No.
68-JD-1362 (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct. Juv. Div. 1968), abstracted in 6 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 284 (1972), 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 575 (1973), 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 58 (1975)
(minors over 13, admitted to a mental hospital as voluntary patients on the application
of a third party, can request their own discharge, must be so informed of this right on
admission, and must be permitted to leave within five days of such request); In re
Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) (minors over the age of 16 cannot be
compelled by their parents to have an abortion); In re Slayton, No. 183756 (Mich.
Wayne County P. Ct. 1972) (fifteen-year old's consent required for admission to a
mental hospital; father's consent alone is insufficient); In re Anonymous, 42 Misc. 2d
572, 248 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Nassau County Ct. 1964) (parents could not place their tenyear old child in a mental hospital when hospitalization was not shown to be necessary). But see, Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) prob. juris.
noted, 96 S. Ct. 1457 (1976) (minors entitled to a hearing within 72 hours after being
committed to a mental institution by their parents).
The Illinois ,Juvenile Court Act does not require a MINS to accept treatment or
to participate in a treatment program.
86. See, e.g., D. FOGEIL, THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975); Morris, The
Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1974).
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whether his transgression was a serious felony or a trivial misdemeanor or status offense."7 In the latter cases, problems of
proportionality arise. The "catch-22" inherent in the right to
treatment theory is that if one mode of therapy fails, the minor
may be kept in custody while one treatment method after another is tried; or worse, the ineffective therapy may simply
continue indefinitely, despite lack of response. Examples of a
minor's "unresponsiveness to treatment" in a correctional institution may include swearing at those in authority, refusing
to work, smoking, drinking, and the like.
Most delinquents are not "ill" in any medically definable
way. Many suffer from the general malaise of poverty, with its
attendant dislocation of families, and inadequate education
and vocational opportunities. 8 These ills are not cured by
treating the minor. Thus, when commission of a criminal offense justifies incarceration, but the minor proves unresponsive
to treatment, the duration of the intervention should be limited
by statute, in proportion to the severity of the offense committed. Sanford Fox calls it the "child's right to punishment" 5 -a
minor confined for treatment who cannot benefit from what the
state has to offer has a right to take his punishment and be
done with ineffectual interference.
Involuntary confinement without treatment. Justice Fortas in Kent v. United States0 and In re Gault' made note of
the fact that a minor gives up procedural protections in the
juvenile justice system in exchange for "treatment." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit endorsed this theory in Nelson v. Heyne,11 finding that a minor
involuntarily confined because of deviant behavior had a constitutional right to treatment.
Turning now to the right to treatment principle as it applies to minors who have committed violations of the criminal
law, consider the fact that notwithstanding the parens patriae
rhetoric contained in the preambles of most juvenile court acts,
state intervention in most cases of criminality by minors is
See, e.g., I,. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-11 (1972) which provides that the
court has jurisdiction over the minor until his or her twenty-first birthday.
See generally E. SCHUR, supra note 45.
Fox, The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment,
JUVENILE JUSTICE, Vol. 25, No.2, Aug., 1974, at 2.
90. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
91. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
92. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).

87.
juvenile
88.
89.
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based more on society's need for protection than the minor's
need for treatment. The juvenile court in delinquency cases,
while it has a rehabilitative focus, is nonetheless serving societal ends similar to those served by the criminal court: condemnation, deterrence and incapacitation of those whose behavior
is threatening to society.93 If we decline to acknowledge this
function of the juvenile court, then those offenders whose problems are beyond the capability of behavioral scientists to diagnose or treat would be entitled to release from institutions lacking programs to meet their treatment needs. The attractiveness
of the right to treatment doctrine viewed in this context is
inversely proportional to the dangerousness of the offender.94
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,9" Justice Burger was sharply
critical of the quid pro quo theory (adopted by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals) as it applies to the mentally ill. He wrote:
It is too well established to require extended discussion
that due process is not an inflexible concept. .

.

. Where

claims that the State is acting in the best interests of an
individual are said to justify reduced procedural and substantive safeguards, this Court's decisions require that
they be "candidly appraised." . . .
The quid pro quo theory is a sharp departure from,
and cannot coexist with, these due process principles. As
an initial matter, the theory presupposes that essentially
the same interests are involved in every situation where a
State seeks to confine an individual; that assumption,
however, is incorrect ....
A more troublesome feature of the quid pro quo theory
is that it elevates a concern for essentially procedural safeguards into a new substantive constitutional right ...
In sum, I cannot accept the reasoning of the Court of
Appeals and can discern no basis for equating an involuntarily committed mental patient's questioned unconstitutional right not to be confined without due process of law
with a constitutional right to treatment. Given the present
state of medical knowledge regarding abnormal human
behavior and its treatment, few things would be more
fraught with peril than to irrevocably condition a State's
power to protect the mentally ill upon the providing of
"such treatment as will give [them] a realistic opportunity to be cured.""
93.
94.
95.
96.

See, e.g., F. AIEN, supra note 27, at 49-60.
Id.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Id. at 584-89 (citations omitted).
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Nor could Justice Burger accept the theory that a state may
lawfully confine an individual thought to need treatment and
justify that deprivation of liberty solely by providing some
treatment. As he said, "Our concepts of due process would not
tolerate such a 'trade-off.'

"I'

Conclusion. The parens patriae philosophy of the juvenile
court system has resulted in theoretical and practical problems
which still plague it. Minors whose conduct may not justify the
application of coercive intervention by the state are often
caught up in the system and subjected to treatment that is
either unnecessary or ineffective. The meager resources of the
juvenile court are thus squandered in attempting to treat problems for which the judicial system is ill-equipped." On the
other hand, this philosophy has served to mask the hard reality
that juvenile court intervention in the case of the minor offender whose conduct is a threat to the community is in truth
based not upon the court's ability to rehabilitate the offender
but rather on society's need to control such behavior. A frank
acknowledgement of these facts indicates that societal expectations of what the court can do effectively in areas of delinquency prevention and control have been overbroad. If so, the
juvenile justice system "failures" in such areas may be due
more to society's unrealistic expectations than to internal defects in the court system itself.
B. The Minor's Right to Treatment: The Right to Necessary
Social, Educational and Other Services
The second dimension of the right to treatment involves
obtaining services for minors in need of them, as contrasted
with the state's right, through the juvenile court, to do something to a child for the purpose of treatment. Will the child's
right to treatment support the juvenile court's application of
coercive power to public agencies to secure better services for
court wards? The court's coercive power traditionally has been
directed against the child, not the agencies required to provide
care and service. When one recalls the origins of the juvenile
court, this fact is not surprising. Many state agencies have
statutory obligations to provide care and service to children.
97. Id.at 589.
98. See McCarty, Juvenile Justice: The Economics of Ineptitude, 10 SAN DIECO
L. REv. 250 (1975).
99. See note 105 infra.
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If the child has a "right to treatment," may the juvenile court
become the child's advocate and enforce this right by using its
power to demand and secure adequate services from such agencies?"'
Notwithstanding the theoretical and practical limitations
of the right to treatment as it applies to juveniles who are not
ill or who are untreatable, juvenile court laws throughout the
country require courts to attempt to secure for the minor who
has been removed from his home custody, care and discipline
as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should be given
by his parents.'0 ' The Illinois Juvenile Court Act, as recently
amended, states: "Every child has a right to services necessary
to his proper development, including health, education and
social services."102 If state and federal courts become more willing to find that the legislative intent behind statutes containing such language was to mandate treatment, and if courts
accept Justice Black's theory that to deprive a person of a
statutory right, once granted, is a due process violation,'03 more
decisions will emerge holding that a juvenile has a constitutional right to treatment; nor would the right be limited to
those juveniles who are institutionalized. All children subject
to juvenile court intervention, whether for a delinquent offense,
a status offense, or because they are neglected or dependent,
04
would enjoy such a right.'
If the right to treatment gains recognition and acceptance,
the burden of implementing it will rest largely upon the federal
and state courts. However, the emergence of a right to treatment, whether based upon the federal constitution or upon
state statute, may provide juvenile courts with a tool to force
state and local governmental agencies charged with the responsibility of supplying care to children to treat such children on
an individual basis. Juvenile courts may begin to assume an
advocate's role on behalf of court wards in obtaining and monitoring services from such agencies.
Laws have been passed establishing or protecting chil-

l00.

See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT AcT § 255 (McKinney 1975).
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 7 01-2(1)(Supp. 1976); CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1976).
102. h.1.. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(3)(b) (Supp. 1976); see also CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 502(a) (West Supp. 1976).
103. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
104. See Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 157.
101.
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dren's rights in areas such as education and health.' 5 Numerous public agencies have become involved in the socialization
of our children, and have statutory obligations to provide service. Related to this is the growing belief that certain services
are essential for a child's welfare, and therefore must be made
available to all as a matter of right. Child advocacy programs
have adopted the position that not only the family, but schools,
hospitals, courts and other institutions affecting children are
crucial determinants in child development.'"' Consequently,
those entrusted with the responsibility of dealing with juvenile
problems must turn their attention from the family-traditionally the focus of intervention-to the operation of other
institutions that play a major role in a child's life. It can be
persuasively argued that this shift in focus, first articulated
by the child advocacy movement, is one that juvenile courts
must also make if the validity of their existence as separate
courts is to be defended as we enter the last quarter of the 20th
century. Because it not only provides services but makes the
services of other institutions available, the juvenile court is
potentially both a target for and an instrument of advocacy.
The court is one of the most highly visible of the institutions
serving youth, playing a major role in the lives of children in
trouble, affecting essential rights, in varying degrees, in all of
its processes. Understandably, with increased public sensitivity about rights, the shortcomings and failures of the court, if
not the most grievous, have certainly been the most conspicuous. They have been the objects of analysis, criticism, pressure,
confrontation, legislation and litigation-and each of these activities has at times been called advocacy. A recent study
(called the "baseline study") correctly states that "these courts
have been the targets of reformers who want to redefine their
jurisdiction or procedures by reforming state laws."'0 7 The
Juvenile Justice Standards Project of the American Bar
Association and Institute of Judicial Administration is a notable example of such an effort.
105. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14.401 et seq. (Supp. 1976) wherein the
County Boards of Education are required to provide educational programs for mentally
and physically handicapped children. Cf., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 894, 895 (West Supp.
1976).
Also, minors may obtain certain kinds of medical treatment in Illinois without
parental consent. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 18.4, 18.7 (Supp. 1976).
106. A. KAHN, S. KAMERMAN, B. McGOWAN, CHILD ADVOCACY, REPORT OF A NATIONAL BASELINE STUDY 761 (1972).
107. Id. at 100.
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1. Class advocacy. The "baseline study" notes that family and juvenile courts have been the focus of major class actions in recent decades.101 For examples of advocacy litigation
directed against juvenile courts, the experience in Cook
County, Illinois, is fairly typical. A spate of class actions
against judges and officers of the court sought and obtained a
variety of institutional changes. Placing neglected and dependent children in the Detention Center was prohibited by one
decision."" Other litigation resulted in limiting the use of detention for minors in need of supervision;"" systematic notice
to juveniles of their right to appeal, with transcript and court
appointed counsel provided without cost to indigents;'1 and an
end to the practice of detaining in the county jail, pending
trial, minors waived to criminal court for trial as adults."'
Conversely, there are relatively few reported cases where
juvenile courts themselves have been vehicles of advocacy, ordering institutions and agencies to provide or improve services
to children. In 1973, the Juvenile Court of Cook County entered
an order attempting to change certain practices of the Illinois
Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, with respect to
treatment of delinquent wards of the court committed to that
agency." ' Plaintiff Douglas Owen was confined in the Industrial School for Boys, a correctional facility, pursuant to an
order of the Juvenile Division of the Cook County Circuit
Court. He had been adjudged delinquent and under Illinois law
continued to be a ward of the court. He and other named defendants petitioned on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, alleging that children at the school were subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment and were denied due process of
law. After a hearing, the juvenile court found that injections of
a tranquilizing drug, thorazine, were forcibly administered to
the children as a behavior control device, and that solitary
confinement was imposed as punishment without any procedural protections. Upon these findings, the juvenile court entered an order enjoining both nontherapeutic use of the drug
108.
109.
110.
1973).
IlI.
1974).

112.
113.

Id.
General Order No. 69-20 (11. Cook County Cir. Ct. Juv. Div., June 24, 1969).
General Order No. 73-239 (I1. Cook County Cir. Ct. Juv. Div., Oct. 13,
General Order No. 74-255 (I1. Cook County Cir. Ct. Juv. Div., March 13,
Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Il1. 1975).
Owen v. Illinois, 54 Il. 2d 104, 295 N.E.2d 455 (1973).
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and the imposition of punishment without notice and hearing." 4 The court ordered that the injections be given only pursuant to written rules as part of a therapeutic program, and
that the Department of Corrections establish procedural guidelines for disciplinary proceedings." ' The court specified in some
detail what these rules and guidelines should contain."' The
order was based upon the court's statutory powers to require
custodians to report to the court concerning care of court
wards, not upon constitutional grounds. However, the order
was designed to curb many of the procedures and practices that
concerned the federal courts in Nelson v. Heyne"7 and Morales
v. Turman,"' two decisions that did involve the constitution.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court, stating
that if each juvenile court of the state's 102 counties entered
similar orders specifying the manner in which its wards should
be treated, it would become administratively impossible to
operate a state institution." ' The court expressly refused to
consider to what extent judicial intervention could appropriately have been used to relieve the abuses, but said it was not
aware of any case where the postdisposition authority granted
a juvenile court has been construed to authorize the court to
establish detailed procedures for the care and discipline of
wards committed to an institution operated by the executive
branch of state government.'2 0
It should be recalled, however, that in several cases, of
which Nelson v. Heyne'' and Morales v. Turman22 are examples, courts have adopted an advocate's role by entering federal
orders in class action suits requiring creation of treatment programs, staff additions and procedural changes, all of which
necessarily affect state budgetary priorities.'23
2. Case advocacy. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act, in
which the Illinois Supreme Court failed to find authority for
active judicial intervention in correctional facility programs, is
typical of statutes throughout the country. A minor's wardship
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 106, 295 N.E.2d at 456.
Id. at 106-07, 295 N.E.2d at 457-58.
Id.
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
Owen v. Illinois, 54 Il.2d 104, 109, 295 N.E.2d 455, 458 (1973).
Id. at 110, 295 N.E.2d at 458.
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.Tex. 1973).
See also cases cited in note 83 supra.
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endures until age 21 unless earlier terminated by court order.,"
During this period of wardship the court has power over the
minor, but has no express power to deal with agencies whose
activities affect the minor's life. Generally, efforts to
strengthen the hand of juvenile courts in ordering treatment
and monitoring service rendered by public child welfare agencies have followed one of three approaches.
The first approach: legislation. The State of New York has
resorted to legislation to resolve the issue of the extent of the
juvenile court's power to intervene and redirect the policies and
programs of other state and local agencies to secure better service for wards of the court. In 1972, the New York Family Court
Act was amended to give the family court, or a judge thereof,
the power to order "any state, county and municipal officer and
employee to render such assistance and cooperation as shall be
within his legal authority, as may be required to further the
objects of this act."' 25 The amendment further gave the family
court judge the power and duty to order "any agency or other
institution to render such information, assistance and cooperation as shall be within its legal authority concerning a child
who is or shall be under its care, treatment, supervision or
custody as may be required to further the objects of this act."' 26
An interesting account of the genesis of section 255 of the
New York Family Law Act is found in the family court opinion
in the case of In re Edward M. 27 The impetus for the amendment had come from the 1972 Report of the Assembly Select
Committee on Child Abuse, and it was to that report that the
Edward M. court turned for guidance on legislative intent. The
Committee, concerned primarily with prevention of child
abuse, had noted that the family court "is . . .the lynchpin
upon which the entire out-of-court system depends," and is "in
many ways, a unique court, dependent upon numerous outside
agencies to make its processes effective."' 2 The court quoted
at length from the Committee Report language which was itself
a quotation from an earlier New York Senate study:
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-11 (1972). See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 607 (West 1972).
125. N.Y. FAMIILY COURT ACT § 255 (McKinney 1975).
126. Id.
127. 76 Misc. 2d 781, 351 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Fain. Ct.), aff'd, 45 App. Div. 2d 906,
357 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1974).
128. Id. at 783, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
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Compounding the difficulties confronting the Family
Court judge is the absence of adequate supporting services.

From adjudication to disposition, the Family Court judge
is "dependent upon the cooperation and assistance of other
municipal agencies and private social agencies, so often
understaffed and ill equipped to meet even the minimum
needs and demands of this court, contributing heavily to
its inability to become the social forum it was designed to
be.'''2 9
The Committee continued:
The fragmented patchwork of child welfare agencies is responsible for lack of communication, inefficiency and inadequate service. The list of agencies in itself reveals the
splintering of services. A family in trouble too often gets
lost in the maze of agencies. Repeating their problems over
and over again to social worker after social worker becomes
frustrating, annoying, and destructive to any helping relationship. "
The amendment to the New York Family Court Act has
been utilized a number of times to secure services for children
from state and local agencies which were required to provide
such services, but either had failed to do so, or were providing
inappropriate service to the child. The court is also empowered
by this amendment to fix ultimate responsibility for specific
services on certain state or local agencies when those agencies
cannot agree which of them is responsible for attending to the
child's needs. 3'
Procedurally, before the family court can enter an order
directing the assistance and cooperation of a state, county or
municipal officer, a hearing must be held to establish the following: (1) the specific services needed; (2) that it is within the
legal authority of the public agency before the court to provide
those services; (3) that it is reasonable for the court to expect
the agency to provide the services to a court ward; and (4) the
reasonable time limit within which to expect the agency to
begin delivery of service.' 2
An examination of some recent New York family court
decisions in individual cases is illuminating. It offers a glimpse
129.
130.
131.
132.
1974).

Id.
Id., 35 N.Y.S.2d at 605-06.
N.Y. FAMILY COURT Acr § 255 (McKinney 1975).
In re Edward M., 76 Misc. 2d 781, 787, 351 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607-09 (Fain. Ct.
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of how a court armed with such statutory authority can become
an advocate for children.
Efforts to secure better mental health services for children
in need of them have produced a series of useful decisions. In
re Leopoldo Z. 33 presented the court with the difficult problem
of fixing responsibility for appropriate placement of a mentally
retarded delinquent child. Leopoldo had been placed on probation as a person in need of supervision in January, 1973. In
February, 1974, he was adjudicated delinquent for a fatal
shooting. The psychiatric, psychological and social service reports all recommended a structured setting where he could
receive educational rehabilitation and vocational training. The
probation officer had a list of such agencies that had been
contacted, but reported that all had rejected the boy because
of his retardation. A division of the State Department of Mental Hygiene was recommended. An administrator of that division appeared before the court and said that although Leopoldo
was within the spectrum of the agency's services, the agency
was not prepared to deal with children with behavioral problems such as his.'34 Yet the psychologist for the Department
reported that under no circumstances should the boy be returned home.'3 5 The family court judge felt he could no longer
in good conscience hold the boy in the Detention Center; neither could he, merely "for want of a better alternative," place
Leopoldo in a training school. Consequently, the court ordered
the Department of Mental Hygiene to find or create a suitable
facility in which Leopoldo could be placed.'38
In re David M.'37 illustrates the manner in which a family
court judge armed with appropriate power can intervene on
behalf of a child to prevent his being bounced back and forth
between mental health and corrections authorities, each of
which disclaims responsibility for custodial care. David's institutional history began at the age of seven when he was sent to
the psychiatric division of the city hospital. He had been referred by his school because of his restless, aggressive and destructive behavior. A diagnosis of childhood schizophrenia was
made, and after four months he was released. Between the time
of his release and his appearance in the family court, David had
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

78 Misc. 2d 866, 358 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Fam. Ct. 1974).
Id. at 867, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
Id. at 868, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
Id.
77 Misc. 2d 491, 354 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Fam. Ct. 1974).
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been in one hospital six times and in another hospital twice.
Indeed, in the previous six years, the longest period he had
been able to remain outside an institution had been less than
one month. He came before the family court charged with attempted murder, assault and robbery. The alleged acts occurred during an escape from the hospital, a feat which David
had managed before, because the hospital was not a secure
institution. The judge noted that the juvenile was a patient at
a mental hospital and returned him to that institution. David
stayed there for a short time, then was discharged and returned
to court, which remanded him to the Detention Center to await
hearing.'3 1 However, before a hearing could be held the Center
psychiatrist advised the court that David was unmanageable,
assaultive, and urgently needed hospitalization, since the Detention Center had no treatment programs for mentally ill children. '1 9 The court sent David back to the hospital. Twenty-two
days later the hospital discharged him, and he was again sent
to the Detention Center. Within five days, the psychiatrist
asked that David be removed as a danger to himself and others. 4 ") David was returned to the hospital but was promptly
discharged and was back in court in a month.' In an emergency report, the court psychiatrist wrote, "We again for the
third time, respectfully urge the court not to return this
youngster to Juvenile Center."' 4 2 An exasperated judge sent
David back to the hospital, and ordered a hearing to resolve the
issue of the youngster's care.
Finding that David was an appropriate subject neither for
treatment in an ordinary mental hospital nor for placement in
a typical juvenile correctional facility, the court determined
that the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene had statutory authority to provide or contract for proper custodial care; that he
should have done so; and that he should not have discharged
a mentally ill child to the family court.' The court therefore
ordered
pursuant to the powers granted under Section 255 of the
Family Court Act that the State Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene provide or contract for a proper facility for the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 492, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
Id. at 493, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
Id., 354 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.
Id., 354 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
Id.
Id. at 495-96, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
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care and treatment of this mentally ill child by implementing the recommendations of the psychiatrists for a structured, closed residential setting.'"
A similar ruling was made by the court in In re Graham S. 415
In each case the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene was ordered
to submit to the court within a specified period of time a plan
for the placement and treatment of a dangerous, mentally ill
child. 4 '
State and local school authorities have also been ordered
to provide appropriate services (or pay the cost of such services
if provided by others) under the authority given the family
court by section 255. In a 1973 case, In re Anthony W., 47 the
family court ordered the New York Commissioner of Education
to approve state reimbursement of half the cost of special education services for a physically handicapped child. A similar
case, In re John M., 45 involved a child with a serious speech
defect. He was before the court for truancy, which began when
he was enrolled in a new school. It appeared that his schoolmates at the second school teased him because of his speech
defect, whereas his friends at the previous school had accepted
him. The Board of Education refused to readmit him to his old
school because he no longer resided in the district it served.
The court ordered the Board of Education to readmit John to
his former school. 149
Complete commitment to the concept of child advocacy is
perhaps best illustrated by a quotation from the opinion of
Judge Stanley Gartensen in another school case, In re Carlos
P. 11 A local school board had refused to admit Carlos to a
vocational high school near his home because he had applied
for admission after the deadline for enrollment had passed. The
school offered programs suited to his particular talents, but he
had been unable to meet the admission deadline because at
that time he was in the custody of the family court. After
ordering the board to admit the child to the school, Judge
Gartensen wrote:
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 496, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
78 Misc. 2d 351, 356 N.Y.S.2d 768
Id. at 355, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
74 Misc. 2d 380, 344 N.Y.S.2d 682
75 Misc. 2d 672, 347 N.Y.S.2d 866
Id. at 676, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
78 Misc. 2d 851, 358 N.Y.S.2d 608

(Fam. Ct. 1974).
(Fam. Ct. 1973).
(Fam. Ct. 1973).
(Fam. Ct. 1974).
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Perhaps a history of our time will someday define the
function of the law and its courts as the intervenor between
an individual struggling to be recognized as human and
the vast bureaucracy which tends to dehumanize him.
Bureaucracy and red tape have a way of feeding on
themselves. When they trap a human being, he is categorized; placed on the assembly line; labeled, packaged and
delivered at the end of this treadmill wholly anesthetized
as a neat stack of reports, each of which has picked up its
requisite complement of marginal initials on the way.
When the frustration becomes intolerable, this human
being is often impelled to perform some act affirming that
he is in fact alive and unique. In his rage, the delinquent
youth who is promised but receives no treatment might
well become the misfit of tomorrow. It is tragic enough that
Society's insoluble problems contribute to this process.
But it is criminal when we are given a chance to intervene
and let it pass us by. The court is here given this opportunity, indeed, the positive statutory duty to do so. In the light
of the unsatisfactory choice of dispositional alternatives
which Society at large has made available to this court, a
condition for which Society has the temerity to blame the
court itself, it will not allow this opportunity to slip
through its fingers.''
County social service departments have also been targets
of the New York family court's intervention to secure additional or more appropriate services for juveniles. In re Norman
C. '" involved a motion that the juvenile be remanded to the
Department of Social Services rather than kept in the Family
Court Detention Center pending his next court hearing. The
family court granted the motion. Emphasizing that Norman
had merely been accused, not adjudicated delinquent, the
court pointed out that under similar circumstances a child with
parents would have been returned home on parole until the
hearing. Holding a destitute child in the detention facility
merely because he did not have "the good fortune to have parents" to look after him, the court concluded, was a denial of
equal protection.
The court feels that the Department of Social Services
must stand now in the place of a parent to this boy and
he must be accommodated by them . . .in some other
151.
152.

Id. at 852, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
74 Misc. 2d 710, 345 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
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facility. The Department of Social Services, if it does not
have facilities for such a youngster must find facilities so
that the Family Court Act can be complied with. This boy
• . . should be presumed innocent until proven guilty. He
should not be denied the same rights as every other
youngster who has . . . parents to insure his protection.'53
The family court of St. Lawrence County, New York,
utilizing the amendment in another case, In re Edward M.,11
ordered the County Department of Social Services to develop
a program to meet every readily foreseeable contingency involved in the placing of juvenile delinquents or persons in need
of supervision in foster care. The plan was to include ongoing
training programs for foster parents, and a means of assuring
that no child would be permitted to remain indefinitely in the
uncertainty of the detention home nor returned to his own
home if needed care and supervision were lacking. In addition
to highlighting effective judicial intervention, this case also
illustrates the dilemma of the district attorney. As attorney for
county departments he is required to defend a county agency
charged with failure to provide services. Yet as the prosecutor
of a juvenile, he has the duty to see that the child whose adjudication he has sought and obtained receives appropriate services
upon disposition. In this case the district attorney found himself in the position of arguing that the family court had no
power to direct the Commissioner of Social Services to take
specific action. The court responded:
I am mindful of the rule . . . that the Court should not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of those whose
duty is to administer agencies and institutions. However,
under § 255 that rule may be superseded in a particular
case where the nature and urgency of the need presented
and the consequences of the failure to provide services require court action. This is particularly true when the root
cause of the difficulty is administrative inaction as distinguished from a dispute over the appropriateness of a particular action. Thus, in a given case, the officer may not
hide behind a shield of insufficient time, inadequate staff,
insufficient funds, or mere rhetoric. Under § 255 the Court
is given the authority to order the officer into action so that
the needs of people before the Court can be met.'55
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 712, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
76 Misc. 2d 781, 351 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Fam. Ct. 1974).
Id. at 787, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
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5
Upon appeal the trial court's holding was sustained. '
Section 255 has also been used by the New York family
court to expunge a juvenile's record with a police department
after the court had dismissed the delinquency petition flied
against the child. In response to the argument that the family
court had no jurisdiction over police department records, the
court found in In re Terrance J. 57 that the amendment to the
Family Court Act did confer such jurisdiction.
The second approach: "inherent powers." Courts in jurisdictions lacking the specific statutory authority conferred by
the New York Family Court Act have relied on other theories
to justify court supervision of public agencies that are failing
in their responsibility to provide services to court wards. In a
5
recent Minnesota case, J.E. C. v. State, the Hennepin County
District Court, Juvenile Division, ruled that the judicial
branch may insist that agencies of the executive branch respond to the needs of wards of the juvenile court. It specifically
required the Department of Corrections to create a program for
the rehabilitation of children accused of major offenses which
would also provide adequate protection to the public, thereby
making it unnecessary for the juvenile court to transfer all
youths accused of major offenses to adult court. On appeal this
156. 45 App. Div. 2d 906, 357 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1974).
157. 78 Misc. 2d 437, 353 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Fam. Ct. 1974). Subsequent cases illustrate that the juvenile courts are still exercising their powers given to them under the
New York Family Court Act to review the treatment of juveniles. See, e.g., In re
Raymond M., 81 Misc. 2d 70, 364 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Fam. Ct. 1975) (the Department of
Social Services did not use statutorily required diligent efforts to strengthen the
parent-child relationship); In re John H., 48 App. Div. 2d 879, 369 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1975)
(PINS defendant should not have been committed to the state training school unless
other, less restrictive alternatives had been explored and found wanting); In re Paul
H., 47 App. Div. 2d 853, 365 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1975) (child should not have been committed where parent had admitted his own fault in supervision of the child, and the child
himself was not at fault).
There may be limits, however, on the power of the New York Family Courts to
review the treatment of juveniles pursuant to § 255. See note 56 supra.
158. 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1975). See also In re Joyce Z., No. 2035-69
(Pa. Allegheny County Ct. C.P. Fam. Div. Juv. Sec. 1975), abstracted in 7 JUVENILE
CT. DIGEST 14 (1975).
A Florida appellate court has recently upheld the authority of the juvenile court
to regulate the placement of children after giving custody of them to the state department of family services. Division of Family Servs. v. State, 319 So. 2d 72 (Fla. App.
1975).
Also, in In re A.D., abstracted in 7 JUVENILE CT. DIGEST 164 (1976), the Juvenile
Court of Harris County, Texas, ordered a government agency to pay for a juvenile's
treatment in a private facility and enjoined the agency from removing the child from
the private facility.
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order was reversed, further indication that appellate courts are
most reluctant to find that juvenile courts have power to demand specific programs from public child welfare agencies,
absent express statutory authority."'
The thirdapproach:contempt power. In Pennsylvania, the
juvenile court of Allegheny County, in Janet v. Carro, I used
the contempt power to impose a personal fine of 100 dollars
upon the local Commissioner of Social Service, who had repeatedly failed to provide the court with an individual plan adequate to the needs of a difficult-to-place ward of the juvenile
court.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court orders issued in many of the cases discussed
above must necessarily.have a substantial impact on the state
budget. State legislatures will have to appropriate funds to
enable agencies of the executive branch of government to provide the services to children mandated by state mental health
and juvenile codes, and by courts acting under the authority
expressly or impliedly conferred by such statutes. It is obvious
that separation of powers problems arise when the judicial
branch of government assumes an advocacy role to secure adequate treatment. What power does a court have to enforce its
order if the legislature refuses? May courts order agencies to
alter their program priorities when there aren't enough funds
to provide programs to meet the needs of all the individual
children who come to the court's attention? Again, some federal courts are answering this question affirmatively. ' May a
court order specific treatment programs or dictate the terms
and conditions governing a child's commitment to an agency
or, even more importantly, of his release to the community?
Such actions may intrude upon areas of discretion usually reserved by the legislature to particular agencies. In response to
the argument that juvenile court intervention into agency deci159. 225 N.W.2d at 254.
160. No. 1079-73 (Pa. Allegheny County Ct. C.P. Fam. Ct. Juv. Sec. 1974),
abstracted in 6 JUVENILE CT. DIGEST 139 (1974). See also 2 FAMILY LAW RPTR. 1393
(1976).
161. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the federal judiciary can
compel governmental agencies of the state to spend public monies to meet constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But see Edleman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (11th
amendment prohibits award of retroactive welfare payments by a federal court).
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sions is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, one can
assert that juvenile court statutes speak generally about securing for each minor such care and services62 as best serve the
interests of the minor and the community.1
In Illinois, the trend in recent years has been away from
involving the court in direct placement of wards needing longterm care outside the home. The placement function has been
taken over primarily by state public welfare agencies, and primary responsibility for securing care and services for such chil3
dren has devolved upon them." This limits the role of the
court, for the most part, to determination of which children are
proper candidates for removal from their homes and commitment to such agencies.' 4 Disillusionment with the quantity
162. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-2 (Supp. 1976).
163. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 5005 et seq. (Supp. 1976) which established the State Department of Children and Family Services.
164. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2 (Supp. 1976); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 727 (West Supp. 1976).
Generally, without a specific mandate, such as that provided in New York, courts
have been unwilling to interfere with social service agencies in the executive branch
regarding the question of treatment. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz.
117, 245 P.2d 628 (1952) (after commitment, a minor is under the exclusive control of
state institutions); Jones v. State, 134 Ga. App. 611, 215 S.E.2d 483 (1975) (the State
Department of Human Resources alone has the authority and responsibility to establish policies and standards governing youth development centers); In re Jones, 432 Pa.
44, 246 A.2d 356 (1968) (question of inadequate treatment in a state facility for delinquents must be dealt with by the legislature, not by the courts).
The courts have been more willing to intervene in situations where a minor has
been improperly or unlawfully committed to a state or federal treatment facility. These
decisions touch on the treatment issue only insofar as they review whether a minor
should have been committed for treatment in the first place. See, e.g., People v.
Grieve, 131 I1. App. 2d 1078, 267 N.E.2d 19 (1971); In re Johnson, 30 Ill. App. 2d 439,
174 N.E.2d 907 (1961); In re Hammill, 210 Md. App. 586, 271 A.2d 762 (1970); In re
Walter, 172 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1969); Hill v. State, 454 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1970); Cantu v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1948).
Some courts have held commitment to a residential treatment facility improper
where it was shown that the minor would not receive adequate treatment at the facility
or where other, less restrictive alternatives had not been explored. See, e.g., Wilson v.
Coughlin, 259 Iowa 1163, 147 N.W.2d 175 (1966); In re Roberts, 13 Md. App. 644, 284
A.2d 621 (1971); In re Wilson, 138 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970); In re Haas, 234 Pa.
Super. 422, 339 A.2d 98 (1975). One of the more interesting decisions along this line
was that in Long v. Powell, 388 F. Supp. 422 (D.C. Ga. 1975). A state statute had
provided that delinquent or unruly children who were not amenable to treatment could
be committed to the State Department of Corrections. The court held that the statute
was constitutional on its face but unconstitutional as applied because, in practice,
children were being committed to institutions which were inadequate to provide them
with the treatment they required. The court stated that commitment of minors to
inadequate institutions was "fundamentally unfair." Id. at 429.
It should be noted that approximately half of the juvenile court statutes offer no
indication of what powers the juvenile court may have to order other officials or agen-
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and quality of services rendered by such agencies to juvenile
court wards, as the foregoing cases illustrate, is a present indication that the court may have attenuated its role too greatly
with respect to monitoring the services received by these wards.
A persuasive argument can be made that governmental
institutions-whether they be state child welfare agencies,
courts or legislative bodies-perform best when monitored
from outside their own administrative framework. Agencies are
more responsive to the needs of children committed to their
care if the quality and quantity of services are subject to scrutiny by a court. The juvenile courts are well equipped to perform this function; indeed, it would appear they have a statutory, if not a constitutional mandate to do so.' Unfortunately,
until recently this duty has been largely ignored.
It is understandable that professional social workers might
view the suggestion that the court monitor closely the activities
of social service agencies as unwarranted judicial intrusion into
day-to-day treatment decisionmaking. But this is a misconception. Agency decisions would not be scrutinized from the standpoint of success or failure in a particular case. Judicial review
would be limited to an examination of the criteria used by the
agency in decisionmaking. For example, the juvenile court
would and should inquire as to whether agency decisions reflect
conscientious efforts to respond to children's individual needs,
and whether due regard is given to the fact that as children
grow, they change and their needs change also. This is similar
to the function of appellate courts reviewing factual and discretionary decisions of trial courts: they ask not so much whether
they would have reached the same decision the trial court did,
but whether the decisionmaking process was proper.
If a social agency should disagree with the court as to what
cies to perform acts relating to the treatment and care of juveniles. For the most part,
these statutes outline only the dispositional alternatives available to the court.
It may be argued that the Illinois juvenile court has "inherent power" to make
such orders as will best serve the interests of the child who requires treatment. While
the holding in Owen v. Illinois, 54 Ill. 2d 104, 295 N.E.2d 455 (1973) may seem to be
contrary to this position, it should be noted that the Illinois legislature subsequently
added to the preamble of the Juvenile Court Act a section which provides that "Every
child has a right to services necessary to his proper development, including health,
education and social services." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §701-2(3)(b) (Supp. 1976). The
statute is silent, however, as to how these rights are to be enforced. See also cases cited
in note 83 supra.
165. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-8 (Supp. 1976) which was recently
amended to strengthen the court's authority to monitor activities of public agencies
to which guardianship or custody of juvenile court wards has been given.
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distinctions may be made with respect to children and what
restrictions may legitimately be imposed upon them, the fact
remains that traditionally our society has entrusted ultimate
responsibility for preservation of statutory and constitutional
rights to the judicial system. Issues involving the relationship
of government to persons are decided ultimately by courts of
law, not administrative bodies, no matter how benevolent or
well-intentioned the latter may be.
The juvenile court in many communities is the most highly
visible and influential institution dealing with children on a
day-to-day basis. Until now the focus of the juvenile court has
been on delinquency as a characteristic of the child's behavior
or attitudes. Rehabilitation programs have sought to alter
these characteristics in the minor, to enable him to avoid trouble while living in the existing social environment. It is not
enough, however, to focus only upon the child's problems;
those may be the result of community institutions which are
failing to respond adequately to the particular needs of the
child. Often, inadequacy in community institutions serving
children, or lack of community social service resources necessary to assist particular groups of children, comes first to the
attention of the juvenile court. The traditional response has
been an attempt to manipulate the child. Changing children is
politically safer than altering social institutions and conditions, because it is less disruptive of organized adult society.
However, if the juvenile court is to meet the needs of our urban
society in the last quarter of this century, it must not only
develop rehabilitative programs for court wards but supplement them with dispositions which cause institutional change
in necessary and appropriate cases. Assuming the constitutional problems can be overcome, the effectiveness of the juvenile court as an advocate to obtain more and better services for
children in need of them still remains to be seen. Reported
cases in which the court has assumed an advocacy role on
behalf of its wards are too few at this point to provide a clear
prognosis."'
Whether an amendment to existing juvenile court acts
similar to that passed in New York, or reliance by the juvenile
court upon its inherent powers or its contempt power will transform juvenile courts into more effective instruments of child
166.

See cases cited in note 83 supra.
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advocacy, time and the appellate courts will tell. However,
there are many indications that the juvenile court is at a crossroads, and is seeking new directions and roles in response to the
growing criticism of its procedures and its traditional focus
upon the trivial offender.
In the words of Judge Gartensen of the New York family
court, there appears to be a growing recognition that the court
charged with the responsibility of intervention in people's
lives, [has been] consistently denied facilities giving it
any meaningful alternatives. At a time when the law mandated treatment, society provided none. The very reason
for the existence of this court as a separate entity-that of
providing services-[has been] too often illusory. ...
The U.S. Supreme Court has warned that failing some
unique service to be made available in this court, the noble
social experiment which was its genesis might very well be
discontinued.' "'
Will the juvenile court as a vehicle of child advocacy be that
unique service?
167. In re Carlos P., 78 Misc. 2d 851,

-,

358 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611-12 (1974).

